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Abstract
This paper presents a new mathematical formalism that describes
the quantization of games. The study of so-called quantum games is
quite new, arising from a seminal paper of D. Meyer [12] published in
Physics Review Letters in 1999. The ensuing near decade has seen an
explosion of contributions and controversy over what exactly a quan-
tized game really is and if there is indeed anything new for game theory.
What has clouded many of the issues is the lack of a mathematical for-
malism for the subject in which these various issues can be clearly and
precisely expressed, and which provides a context in which to present
their resolution. Such a formalism is presented here, along with pro-
posed resolutions to some of the issues discussed in the literature. One
in particular, the question of whether there can exist equilibria in a
quantized version of a game that do not correspond to classical cor-
related equilibria of that game and also deliver better payoffs than
the classical correlated equilibria is answered in the affirmative for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Simplified Poker.
1 Classical Background
As with all mathematical formalisms, it’s best to begin with a definition.
Definition 1.1. Given a set {1, 2, · · · , n} of players, for each player a set
Si (i = 1, · · · , n) of so-called pure strategies, and a set Ωi (i = 1, · · · , n) of
possible outcomes, a game G is a vector-valued function whose domain is
∗Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Portland State University, PO Box 751,
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the Cartesian product of the Si’s and whose range is the Cartesian product
of the Ωi’s. In symbols
n∏
i=1
Si
G
−→
n∏
i=1
Ωi
The function G is sometimes referred to as the payoff function.
Here a play of the game is a choice by each player of a particular strategy
si the collection of which forms a strategy profile (s1, · · · , sn) whose cor-
responding outcome profile is G(s1, · · · , sn) = (ω1, · · · , ωn), where the ωi’s
represent each player’s individual outcome. Note that by assigning a real
valued utility to each player which quantifies that player’s preferences over
the various outcomes, we can without loss of generality, assume that the
Ωi’s are all copies of R, the field of real numbers.
In game theory one is frequently concerned with the identification of
special strategies or strategic profiles. For example, most players would love
to identify a strategy that guarantees a maximal utility. As this is not usually
possible, a security strategy, that is, a strategic choice that guarantees an
explicit lower bound to the utility received, is also sought. But for a fixed
(n−1)-tuple of opponents’ strategies, rational players seek a best reply, that
is a strategy s⋆i ∈ Si that delivers a utility at least as great, if not greater,
than any other strategy si ∈ Si. That is
G(⋆, · · · , ⋆, s⋆i , ⋆, · · · , ⋆) ≥ G(⋆, · · · , ⋆, si, ⋆, · · · , ⋆) ∀si ∈ Si
A Nash equilibrium (NE) for G is a strategy profile (s1, s2, ..., sn) such
that each si is a best reply to the (n−1)-tuple of opponents’ strategies. Other
ways of expressing this concept include the observation that no player can
increase his or her payoffs by unilaterally deviating from his or her equi-
librium strategy, or that at equilibrium a player’s opponents are indifferent
to that player’s strategic choice. As an example, consider the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, a two player game where each player has exactly two strategies
(a so-called 2 × 2 or bimatrix game) whose payoff function is indicated by
the tableau below
t1 t2
s1 (3, 3) (0, 5)
s2 (5, 0) (1, 1)
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Here, note that for player 1 the pure strategy s2 always delivers a higher
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outcome than the strategy s1 (say s2 strongly dominates s1) and for player
2 the strategy t2 strongly dominates t1. Hence the pair (s2, t2) is a (unique)
Nash Equilibrium. However, games need not have equilibria amongst the
pure strategy profiles as exemplified by the 2× 2 game of Simplified Poker
whose payoff function is given by
t1 t2
s1 (5/4,−5/4) (0, 0)
s2 (0, 0) (5/2,−5/2)
Table 2: Simplified Poker
Classical game theoretic formalism now calls upon the theorist to extend
the game G by enlarging the domain and extending the payoff function. Of
course, the question of if and how a given function extends is a time honored
problem in mathematics and the careful application of the mathematics of
extension is what will give our formalism of quantization its power. Return-
ing to classical game theory, a standard extension at this point is to consider
for each player the set of mixed strategies, that is, the set of probability dis-
tributions over Si. For a given set X, denote the probability distributions
over X by ∆(X) and note that when X is finite, with k elements say, the set
∆(X) is just the k− 1 dimensional simplex ∆(k− 1) over X, i.e., the set of
real convex linear combinations of elements of X. Of course, we can embed
X into ∆(X) by considering the element x as mapped to the probability
distribution which assigns 1 to x and 0 to everything else. For a given game
G, denote this embedding of Si into ∆(Si) by ei.
Now our game G can be extended to a new, larger game Gmix, as follows.
Given a profile (p1, . . . , pn) of probability distributions over the Si’s, by
taking the product distribution we obtain a probability distribution over
the product
∏
Si. Taking the push out by G of this probability distribution
we obtain a probability distribution over the image of G. By following this
by the expectation operator we obtain the expected outcome of the mixed
strategy profile (p1, . . . , pn). Assigning the expected outcome to each mixed
strategy profile we obtain the extended game
Gmix :
∏
∆(Si)→
∏
Ωi
Note Gmix is a true extension of G as Gmix ◦ Πei = G; that is we have
the following commutative diagram
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Πni=1∆(Si) ∆(Π
n
i=1Si) ∆(ImG)
Πni=1ΩiΠ
n
i=1Si
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Gmix
Figure 1: Extension of G by Gmix
Nash’s famous theorem [2] says that if Si are all finite, then there always
exists an equilibrium in Gmix. Unfortunately, this equilibrium is called a
mixed strategy equilibrium for G, when it is not an equilibrium of G at all,
the abusive terminology confusing G with its image, ImG. Indeed, this is
where much of the confusion in quantum game theory begins.
But before proceeding onto quantization, it is useful to place other clas-
sical game theoretical ideas such as classical mediated communication and
Aumann’s notion of a correlated equilibrium into this context. One begins
by observing that the function from
∏n
i=1∆(Si) → ∆(ImG) is not neces-
sarily onto. As an example consider any 2 × 2 game G. If player 1 plays
his first pure strategy with probability p, say, and player 2 plays her second
pure strategy with probability q, say, the resulting probability distribution
over the outcomes of G is given by the tableau below:
t1 t2
s1 p(1− q) pq
s2 (1− p)(1− q) (1− p)q
An easy exercise now shows that the element of ∆(ImG) represented by
t1 t2
s1 1/2 0
s2 0 1/2
is not realizable by any choice of p and q. Classical mediated communication
addresses this issue. Suppose during pre-play negotiation the players are able
to hire a referee for negligible cost. For a given ρ ∈ ∆(ImG) the referee is
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meant to enforce ρ as follows. The referee secretly observes a random event
with probability distribution ρ, thus determining an outcome of G. The
referee then communicates to each player only his or her strategic choice
which yields the observed outcome.
Note that the players are no longer playing the game G, but in fact a
much larger game Gcomρ which is easily described for 2× 2 games and whose
generalization to games with larger strategic spaces should be clear from our
description. Suppose the strategic space for each player is represented by
the pair S = {A,B}. The strategic spaces for Gcomρ can be represented by
the quadruple T = {A′, B′, C ′,D′} where the strategy C ′ represents a player
always cooperating with the referee, D′ represents the strategy where the
player always deviates from the referee’s instruction (i.e. playing B when
he hears A and vice-versa), A′ represents cooperating with the referee when
A is recommended and deviating otherwise, and B′ represents cooperating
with the referee when B is recommended and deviating otherwise.
Two other things to note here. First, if both players choose to play C ′,
then the outcome of the new game is exactly the expected outcome under
ρ. Second, Gcomρ extends the original game G as there are embeddings
fi : {A,B} → {A
′, B′, C ′,D′} taking A to A′ and B to B′ such that G =
Gcomρ ◦
∏2
i=1 fi, as in the diagram below
ΠTi
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Πfi
Figure 2: Extension of G by Gcomρ
Hence, classical mediated communication gives a family, indexed by ∆(ImG),
of extensions of G.
Following Aumann [2], a correlated equilibrium for G occurs whenever
(C ′, C ′) is a Nash equilibrium in Gcomρ . That is, the players’ agreement to
follow the referee is self policing, meaning that there is no gain to a player
from unilateral deviating from the referee’s recommendations. Note again
the abusive terminology, the strategic choice for a correlated equilibrium is
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not a strategic choice for G at all, but rather a strategic choice outside the
embedded strategies for G in a larger game. Of course, the use of correlated
equilibrium may or may not improve the lot of the players. A classic example
of correlated equilibrium improving the players’ lot is given by the variant
of the 2× 2 game of Chicken given below
t1 t2
s1 (2, 2) (0, 3)
s2 (3, 0) (−1,−1)
Table 3: Chicken
An easy exercise shows that (s2, t1) and (s1, t2) are both pure strategy
equilibria and there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium where every
player plays each of his or her pure strategies with equal probability. This
mixed strategy equilibrium pays out 1 to each player. It is also easy to
see that even without a referee any real convex linear combination of these
three outcomes forms a self policing agreement between the players. For
example, the players could jointly observe a fair coin and agree to play the
(s1, t2) if it falls Heads and (s2, t1) if it falls Tails. Note that the expected
outcome of this agreement is
(
3
2 ,
3
2
)
which is better than the outcome (1, 1)
from the mixed strategy equilibrium. But even better and outside this
region is the correlated equilibrium arising from the probability distribution
1
3 (2, 2) +
1
3(0, 3) +
1
3(3, 0) yielding the outcome (
5
3 ,
5
3).
An example where mediated communication does not improve the lot of
the players is given by Prisoner’s Dilemma. One easily checks that due to the
strong domination present in each player’s strategy set, players always have
an incentive to deviate from the referee’s instruction if ρ assigns a non-zero
probability to any outcome other than the Nash equilibrium (s2, t2). This
domination is so strong that not even mixed strategy equilibrium that assign
non-zero probability to an outcome other than the Nash equilibrium (s2, t2)
exists. A similar phenomenon occurs in the zero-sum game of Simplified
Poker where any deviations from the equilibrium strategies where player I
chooses his first strategy 23 of the time and player II chooses her second
strategy 13 of the time is fully exploitable by the other player and hence an
incentive to deviate from any other potential correlated equilibrium strategy.
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2 A Formalism for Quantization
Up until now, most authors have, like Meyer, focused their efforts on the
quantization of the players’ strategy spaces, essentially the domain of the
payoff function that defines the game to be quantized (see for example
[7, 8, 11, 12]). The principal technique is to identify these spaces with
an orthogonal basis of some quantum system, in order that players may
now take superpositions or even mixed superpositions of strategic choices
by acting on the system via quantum operations. In addition, players may
now correlate their strategic choices via the entanglement of the joint states
of the system. Frequently, mere access to the higher randomization of su-
perposition (as opposed to real probabilistic combination) or the correlation
of strategic choices via entanglement allows payoffs to the players superior
to those available in the game and its classical extensions.
As a result, over the last decade, much discussion has occurred in the
literature as to whether or not various protocols for achieving these happy
results are indeed “quantum” or contain something new for game theory
[1, 13]. These discussion have focused on the situations when not all players
have access to quantized strategy spaces, as in Meyer’s original penny flip
game [12], classical methods for realizing the correlation given by entangle-
ment exist as for the MW and EWL protocols [13] or as in the Duetchse-
Josza algorithm [6], and the games based on the conditional probability
distributions found in Bell’s theorem as introduced by Landsburg and Dahl
[5] for classical duopoly, and by Iqbal and Cheon for Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Chicken, Stag Hunt, and Battle of the Sexes [9].
The main assertion in [3] is that all of these controversies resolve via
the use of a mathematical formalism for game quantization that focuses on
the quantization of the payouts of the original game G to be quantized, and
expresses the quantized version as a (proper) extension of the original pay-
out function in the set-theoretic sense, just as in the classical case where
exhaustive studies are made of the extensions of classical games obtained
from the probabilistic combinations of payoffs. As mentioned above, these
combinations arise by the players mixing their strategic choices or by com-
municating their strategic choices to a referee. The protocol also allows for
fresh quantum game theoretic interpretations of a number of quantum al-
gorithms and for a broad swath of operations in quantum logic synthesis
[4, 10].
Classically, we constructed the probability distributions over the out-
comes of a game G. We now wish to pass to a more general notion of
randomization, that of quantum superposition. Begin then with a Hilbert
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space H that is a complex vector space equipped with an inner product. For
the purpose here assume that H is finite dimensional, and that we have a
finite set X which is in one-to-one correspondence with an orthogonal basis
B of H.
By a quantum superposition of X with respect to the basis B we mean
a complex projective linear combination of elements of X; that is, a repre-
sentative of an equivalence class of complex linear combinations where the
equivalence between combinations is given by non-zero scalar multiplication.
Quantum mechanics calls this scalar a phase. When the context is clear as to
the basis to which the set X is identified, denote the set of quantum super-
positions for X as QS(X). Of course, it is also possible to define quantum
superpositions for infinite sets, but for the purpose here, one need not be so
general. What follows can be easily generalized to the infinite case.
As the underlying space of complex linear combinations is a Hilbert
space, we can assign a length to each linear combination and, up to phase,
always represent a projective linear combination by a complex linear com-
bination of length 1. This process is called normalization and is frequently
useful.
For each quantum superposition of X we can obtain a probability dis-
tribution over X by assigning to each component the ratio of the square of
the length of its coefficient to the square of the length of the combination.
For example, the probability distribution produced from αx+ βy is just
|α|2
|α|2 + |β|2
x+
|β|2
|α|2 + |β|2
y
Call this function QS(X) → ∆(X) a quantum measurement with respect to
X, and note that geometrically quantum measurement is defined by pro-
jecting a normalized quantum superposition onto the various elements of
the normalized basis B. Denote this function by qmeasX , or if the set X is
clear from the context, by qmeas.
Now given a finite n-player gameG, suppose we have a collection Q1, . . . , Qn
of non-empty sets and a protocol, that is, a function Q :
∏
Qi → QS(ImG).
Quantum measurement qmeasImG then gives a probability distribution over ImG.
Just as in the mixed strategy case we can then form a new game GQ by ap-
plying the expectation operator. Call the game GQ thus defined to be the
quantization of G by the protocol Q. Call the Qi’s sets of pure quantum
strategies for GQ. Moreover, if there exist embeddings e′i : Si → Qi such
that GQ ◦
∏
e′i = G, call G
Q a proper quantization of G. If there exist
embeddings e′′i : ∆(Si) → Qi such that G
Q ◦
∏
e′′i = G
mix, call GQ a com-
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plete quantization of G. These definitions are summed up in the following
commutative diagram. Note for proper quantizations the original game is
obtained by restricting the quantization to the image of
∏
e′i. For general
extensions, the Game Theory literature refers to this as “recovering” the
game G.
ΠQi
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Gmix
Figure 3: A Quantization Formalism
Note that the definitions of Gmix and GQ show that a complete quan-
tization is proper. Furthermore, note that finding a mathematically proper
quantization of a game G is now just a typical problem of extending a func-
tion. It is also worth noting here that nothing prohibits us from having
a quantized game GQ play the role of G in the classical situation and by
considering the probability distributions over the Qi, creating a yet larger
game GmQ, the mixed quantization of G with respect to the protocol Q. For
a proper quantization of G, GmQ is an even larger extension of G. The game
GmQ is described in the commutative diagram of Figure 4.
Note that the quantum strategy sets Qi need not consist of quantum
superpositions, although in many quantization protocols they do, see for
example [7, 11]. Indeed, protocols with classical inputs yielding quantum
superpositions of the outcomes of certain games have already been posited
[5, 9]. These and some other specific protocols are discussed in the context
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Figure 4: Extension of G by GmQ
of the formalism above in [3].
As discussed in [3] and in part the following sections, the literature gives
several protocols for quantizing one, two, and occasionally even multi-player
games, some improper, some proper but not complete, and some yielding
complete quantizations. Yet there is an ongoing debate in the literature as
to what is the ‘correct’ method of quantizing a game. The above formalism
suggests that this is just the wrong question to ask, as under this formal-
ism a given game can admit several different quantizations. It also makes
clear that comparisons between various quantizations, between quantiza-
tions and various classical extensions, and between quantizations and the
original game itself often amounts to comparing “apples” to “oranges”. A
specific example appears next.
3 Communication via the EWL Protocol
In classical mediated communication, players have a referee mediate their
game and the communication of their strategic choices. For simplicity, as-
sume our players have but two classical pure strategies to choose from. The
communication of each players strategic choices is implemented by the send-
ing of bits to the players, put into an initial state by the referee. Presumably
players then send back their individual bits in the other state (Flipped) or
in the original state (Un-Flipped) to indicate the choice of their second or
first classical pure strategy respectively. The bits are then examined by the
referee who then makes the appropriate payoffs.
When the communication between the referee and the players is over
quantum channels, Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein [7] have proposed fami-
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lies of quantization protocols that depend on the initial joint state prepared
by the referee. Players and the referee communicate via qubits, a two pure
state quantum system with a fixed observational basis. In the EWL pro-
tocol the referee determines the outcomes via a new observational basis
corresponding to the actions of (No Flip, No Flip), (No Flip, Flip), (Flip,
No Flip), (Flip, Flip) by the players. Players may choose from any physical
operation (i.e. the Lie group S(2)) as pure quantum strategies (the Qi’s in
the formalism above) or even probabilistic combinations thereof (the ∆Qi’s
in the formalism) for their strategic choices. The procedure above describes
for each initial state I a protocol QI and a quantized and mixed quantized
game GQI and GmQI per the formalism.
If the initial state prepared by the referee is given in the Dirac notation
by |0〉⊗|0〉, then the EWL protocol is a complete quantization and is in fact
equivalent to the classical game Gmix. But when the initial state is given
by the maximally entangled state |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |1〉, the EWL protocol
remains complete and sets up an onto map from the product of the strategy
spaces to ∆ (ImG).
It is here that a fundamental question arises; that is, are Nash equilibria
in such a quantized games truly new? That is, is the probability distribution
that arises from an equilibrium pair in the quantized version of game G dif-
ferent from that arising from a classical correlated equilibrium for G? The
maximally entangled EWL quantization described above admits a mixed
quantum strategy equilibrium where each player uses the uniform probabil-
ity distribution over his or her choice of pure quantum strategy [11]. The
resulting probability distribution over the payoffs of G is now again the uni-
form distribution, assigning an equal probability to each of the four outcomes
of G. Note that for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this distribution does not arise
from a classical correlated equilibrium as it assigns a non-zero probability
to each of the classical non-equilibrium payoffs, and so does not correspond
to any classical correlated equilium for this game, yet delivering a payoff to
the players superior to that of the classical pure strategy equilibrium. An
even more remarkable result holds true for the maximally entangled EWL
quantization of the zero-sum game of Simplified Poker, where the uniformly
mixed quantum equilibrium out performs the classical mixed strategy equi-
librium payoff for player I, yet is still a security strategy for player I against
which player II has no recourse.
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4 Conclusion
The discussion above shows that for the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Simpli-
fied Poker quantization does indeed hold something new for Game Theory.
Several other controversies can be resolved and new game theoretic interpre-
tations of certain problems from quantum computation and quantum logic
synthesis can be illuminated via the quantization formalism described here,
see [3, 4, 10] for details.
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